Existing research suggests that people's judgments of actual causation can be influenced by the degree to which they regard certain events as normal. We develop an explanation for this phenomenon that draws on standard tools from the literature on graphical causal models and, in particular, on the idea of probabilistic sampling. Using these tools, we propose a new measure of actual causal strength. This measure accurately captures three effects of normality on causal judgment that have been observed in existing studies. More importantly, the measure predicts a new effect (''abnormal deflation"). Two studies show that people's judgments do, in fact, show this new effect. Taken together, the patterns of people's causal judgments thereby provide support for the proposed explanation.
Introduction
Judgments of actual causation-concerning the extent to which a given event or factor caused some outcome-have been at the center of attention in work on causal cognition. One intriguing phenomenon that has long been recognized is that people's judgments of actual causation can be influenced by the degree to which they regard certain events as normal. In recent years, this effect has been explored both in experimental studies and in formal models (e.g., Halpern & Hitchcock, 2015; Kominsky, Phillips, Gerstenberg, Lagnado, & Knobe, 2015; Phillips, Luguri, & Knobe, 2015) .
Considerable debate remains about how to explain the effect. One approach would be to posit some independent factor, outside the core processes involved in causal cognition, that explains the impact of normality. For example, one might hypothesize that the impact of normality is the result of a motivational bias or of conversational pragmatics (e.g., Alicke, Rose, & Bloom, 2011; Driver, 2008; Samland & Waldmann, 2016) . Our aim is to explore a different approach. We suggest that the impact of normality might be explained by basic facts about how causal cognition works. Our explanation will rely on standard tools familiar from the literature on graphical causal models and, in particular, on a specific way of thinking about computations over these causal models involving probabilistic sampling. Drawing on these ideas, we propose a measure of actual causal strength. Our hypothesis is that this actual causal strength measure will help to explain the impact of normality.
The key evidence for this hypothesis comes from facts about the precise pattern of the impact of normality on causal judgment. The most well-studied effect in this domain is the tendency whereby people are inclined to regard abnormal events as more causal in certain cases. However, as we will see, the actual pattern is considerably more complex. There are also cases in which people's judgments about the causal status of a given event depend on the normality of other events, and these effects in turn depend on the details of the causal structure in question (Section 2). It can be shown that the causal strength measure proposed below accurately captures the details of these patterns (Section 4). More importantly, this measure generates a novel prediction, namely, that there should be cases in which abnormal events are systematically regarded as less causal. Two new experiments show that this prediction is in fact borne out (Section 5). Taken together, the patterns thereby provide support for the present approach.
Three effects of normality on actual causation judgments
Before discussing the impact of normality on people's actual causation judgments, it may helpful to clarify the notion of normality itself. To begin with, we need to distinguish two kinds of norms. First, there are purely statistical norms. For example, winter months in Oregon generally tend to be cloudy and overcast, so if Oregon ever had a sunny winter, this weather could be said to be violating a statistical norm. Second, there are prescriptive norms. These norms are constituted not by purely statistical tendencies but by the way things ought to be or are supposed to be. Suppose we believe that the police ought to accord criminal defendants cer-
